The EU summit opened on Thursday. There is no doubt that at this meeting, the last in 2021, Russian-Ukrainian issues will be discussed in general in the same way as in previous ones. The participants in the meeting will express common support for Ukraine, will give it money, but not a promise of early accession to the EU. Of course, there will be no hint of the possible adoption of any legally binding documents accelerating Ukraine's European integration. Without discussion, EU leaders will extend anti-Kremlin sanctions, but the adoption of new ones - effective and serious - for which the media has been trumpeting for some time, will not be discussed, writes the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta in an article presented without editorial intervention.
This time, the situation may be radically different from previous summits, because the discussion of the Russian-Ukrainian agenda will reveal contradictions between the "two Europes". The first is "old" Europe, bound to the Kremlin by common economic and political interests, but having no common values with today's Russia, delicately. The second is a "new" Europe - the Baltic states, Poland, and now, after the change of government and the departure of Andrei Babish, who supported Moscow, probably the Czech Republic. They do not have enough common interests with the Kremlin, and with common values, despite all the Euroscepticism of the Polish authorities and their thirst for authoritarian methods, things are not very good either. Moscow has long been trying to build its relations with the EU so that the former brothers of the socialist camp with their complexes, ambitions and insolvency, if possible, are taken out of the brackets.
And so last week's conversation between Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden, as it seems now, opens a page in relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union in which there is absolutely no place for a "new" Europe. It is not the EU and NATO as a whole that will discuss the future security architecture with Russia, but four or five countries that make up these organizations - Germany, France, Italy, Britain. And the United States, of course.
Now American diplomacy will be busy, among other things, explaining to its Eastern European allies why all this is not a victory for the Kremlin, but only a condition for dialogue with it. In the future, if the dialogue does not go the way the Kremlin would like, no explanation will be needed - everything will be clear anyway.
As early as 2009, Russia offered the EU a comprehensive European security treaty. This is a very curious and at the same time ornate document. Its purpose is to make sure that the actions of the signatories, which one of them considers threatening themselves, fall under the restrictions. In fact, everything from the deployment of missiles and tanks to a university lecture on the benefits of democracy given by an American official. If the West agreed to accept the treaty, negotiations with Russia would drag on for many years. Which the Kremlin basically needed. NATO will not expand during the negotiations. And they could go on for a really long time. Unlike Western leaders and outgoing Western leaders, Putin can afford long-term combinations.
Back then, 12 years ago, it was no secret that the agreement was proposed for purely utilitarian purposes. Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych fought for the presidency of Ukraine. If Tymoshenko wins, the issue of the country's accession to the EU and NATO could remain at least in the spotlight. Then a way would be needed to close this issue. Yanukovych's victory in the presidential election successfully "buried" the idea of a treaty. It is now possible that, on the basis of the previous document, Moscow will propose to the West to negotiate.
It is true that now the situation has changed, in the sense that the West is also ready to play in the long run. In 2009, there was no conflict between the United States and China. Now there is one, and everything else before it is fading into the background, at least for Washington. They agree to exclude Russia from the brackets, as long as it does not interfere with the main geopolitical front. This does not mean that Washington and European capitals have suddenly decided to forget once and for all about the idea of EU and NATO enlargement, support for civil society and other things that irritate the Kremlin. There is a pause. The Kremlin, of course, will make sure it lasts longer. But whether it will work - time will tell.
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